Fordham Law School

FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History
Art. 78 Petitions

Court Litigation Documents

February 2020

Art. 78 Petition - FUSL000027 (2015-12-11)

Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/art78_petition

Recommended Citation
"Art. 78 Petition - FUSL000027 (2015-12-11)" (2020). Parole Information Project
https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/art78_petition/7

This Parole Document is brought to you for free and open access by the Court Litigation Documents at FLASH: The
Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Art. 78 Petitions by an
authorized administrator of FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more information,
please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu.

FUSL000027

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK
COUNTY OF NEW YORK

In the Matter of the Application of
Petitioner,

-againstNEW YORK STATE DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTIONS AND COMMUNITY
SUPERVISION, ANTHONY J .
ANNUCCI, ACTING COMMISSIONER
and TINA M. STANFORD,
CHAIRWOMAN, BOARD OF PAROLE,
Respondents

For Judgment Pursuant to Article 78
of the Civil Practice Law and Rules

Notice of Petition
Index No]
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PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that upon the Verified Pt&tion of|
sworn to on November 19, 2015, and the attached exhibits, petitioner will, at 9:30 AM
| in the
on January 20, 2016, at the Courthouse at
Motion Submission Part Courtroom, Room 130, request that this court issue a judgment,
pursuant to Civil Practice Law and Rules (CPLR), granting the following relief:
(1 ) Reverse respondents’ April 27, 2015 denial of parole to Ms.
and grant Ms.
release to parole supervision; or
(2) In the alternative, reverse respondents’ April 27, 2015 denial of parole to Ms.
and order respondents to conduct a de novo parole hearing according
to law and based upon the contemporary record.

and such other and further relief as to this Court may deem just and proper .
Petitioner designated New York County as the place of petition. The basis of
venue is the county where respondents conducted the parole hearing and made the
decision to deny parole. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 506( b).

Pursuant to C.P.L.R. 7804(c), any answer and supporting affidavits shall be
served and filed at least five days before the return date of this application.

t
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Dated: December 11, 2015
Respectfully Submitted,

lartha Rayrtey£

Lincoln Square Legal ServiceSrlnc.
Fordham University School of Law
150 West 62nd Street
New York, New York 10023
(212) 636-6934
Attorney for Petitioner

To:

NYS Department of Corrections and Community Supervision
1220 Washington Ave., Building 2
Albany, New York 12226-2050
Anthony J. Annucci, Acting Commissioner
NYS Department of Corrections and Community Supervision
1220 Washington Ave., Building 2
Albany, New York 12226-2050
,

Tina M. Stanford, Chairwoman
New York State Division of Parole
1220 Washington Ave., Building 2
Albany, New York 12226-2050
Eric T. Schneiderman
New York State Attorney General
120 Broadway, 24th FI.
New York, New York 10271-0332
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PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

The Parole Board’s failure to explain in detail why it denied Ms.

—

parole demonstrates the Board ’s denial was reflexive essentially

—

automatic and premised on the Parole Commissioners’ personal belief that Ms.
should not be eligible for parole, rather than based on application of the legal

standards governing parole decision-making. Justice Budd G. Goodman, Supreme Court,
New York County, however, by sentencing Ms|

to the minimum term of 15

must be considered for parole. Absent a

years to life, determined that Ms|

detailed explanation for denial, this Court cannot detennine whether the decision was
arbitrary or irrational, and this Court cannot determine whether the decision was based on

application of the law or based on reasons outside the standards the Board is required to
apply.

The New York State Department of Corrections and Community Supervision’s

Parole Board [hereinafter the Board] concluded that release of Msj

would so

deprecate the seriousness of the offense so as to undennine respect for law, but, although

the Board explained the offense, it did not explain how release after 19 years of

punishment would undermine the moral credibility of the law. A detailed explanation is
especially necessary when the past crime evokes such emotional outrage that there is a
high risk Board members will impose their individual opinions rather than apply the legal

standard required by law. Here, the Board did not explain why, despite Ms.

unrefuted rehabilitation of the serious mental health and substance abuse issues that
fueled her crime, and Ms.

uncontested demonstration of insight into her

[, a grant of parole after 19 years of

crime and profound remorse for killing her|

5
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incarceration would undermine respect for the law. Absent such an explanation, this
Court cannot assess whether the deprecate standard was properly applied.
The Board also concluded that Ms.

release would be incompatible

with the welfare of society, but did not explain how, in light of definitive evidence of
rehabilitation, she would pose a danger to society. In addition, the Board ’s conclusion

that Ms.

would pose a risk to community safety is inconsistent with the

evidence of rehabilitation (confirmed by the COMPAS risk assessment) and thus

demonstrates the Board failed to consider statutory factors relevant to rehabilitation.
During her incarceration, Ms.

addressed the underlying mental health and

substance abuse issues that significantly contributed to her crime. She reflected on her
crime, gained insight and changed the parts of herself that made her crime possible.
Through significant accomplishments on her part, Ms.

now merits due

consideration of release to parole supervision. Yet, the Board’s short decision does not
evince that Ms.

received the consideration to which she was legally entitled.

See Ex. 1, Parole Board Hearing Transcript and Decision, April 27, 2015.
appeals denial of parole on the following grounds. The Board’s

decision was impermissibly conclusory and did not provide a detailed explanation for its
denial of parole. The Board’s decision was arbitrary and capricious because it failed to

consider all of the statutory factors since it ignored Ms.

mental health and

substance abuse treatment and support of the victim’s family. Moreover, although the
Board claimed it considered other statutory factors, the decision is inconsistent with

participation in programming during her incarceration, her educational and
work achievements, and her detailed post - release plans. The Board ’s denial was based

6
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exclusively on the underlying offense. The Board impermissibly refused to permit Ms.
to make her full personal statement during the hearing. The Board claimed the

sentencing minutes were not available, but since respondents provided the minutes

(minus a critical missing page) to Ms.

counsel before the hearing, they were

available to the Board. The Board relied on information that was not provided to Ms.

COMPAS contained erroneous information. Each ground
warrants reversal. Taken together, the need for a de novo hearing is overwhelming.
VENUE

This action is properly commenced in New York County because it is the county
where the Board conducted the parole hearing and made the decision to deny parole.

N.Y. CPLR § 506(b); Ex. 1 at 1 (“On April 27, 2015, the parole hearing was conducted
via teleconference to the New York office located at 314 West 40th Street, New York,
New York 10018.”).

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Petitioner !

has been denied parole three times; this petition

challenges the most recent parole denial on April 27, 2015, after a hearing conducted via
video conference on the same day. See Ex. 1 at 12. Ms.

timely notice of

administrative appeal was filed on May 19, 2015. See Ex. 2, Petitioner’s Administrative
Appeal of Parole Denial. On October 1 , 2015, counsel for Ms.

received the

Board’s Appeals Unit’s decision affirming the Board ’s denial of parole. See Ex. 3,

Respondents’ Administrative Appeal Decision, October 1, 2015. Ms.

7
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exhausted her administrative remedies and this matter is ripe for the instant Article 78

proceeding.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

Ms]

began her incarceration nearly two decades ago after pleading

guilty and taking responsibility for the neglect and maltreatment that caused the death of

|. At the time, Ms.

was suffering from

severe substance abuse and an array of significant mental illnesses, including Post
Traumatic Stress Disorder from the abuse Ms.
contributed significantly to Ms.

suffered as a child, all of which

crime. See Ex. 4, Psychological Evaluation

by Dr. Barry Rosenfeld, Ph.D., and Samantha Morin, M.A ., April 22, 2015.1 Despite the

severity of Ms.

crime, she is not a psychopath. See Ex 4. at 7 (“Ms.

does not appear to suffer from any personality disorder and demonstrated very

few indicators of psychopathic personality style, i.e. her score on the Psychopathy
Checklist was in the lowest 10% compared to other female criminal offenders.”). Ms.

does not contend that her mental illness and substance abuse excuse her crime.

However, Ms.

[understands that her impaired judgment due to her mental

illness and substance abuse played a role in the commission of her crime. See Ex. 1 at 8
(“At the time of my crime I was mentally ill ... and throughout the years I have worked

very hard to try and understand why and how I could commit such an act.” ). Over the

past 19 years, Ms.

has addressed her mental health and substance abuse issues.

1

This exhibit , as well as exhibits 6, 7 , 9, 10, 11 , 12, 13, 17, 18 , and 19 herein were submitted to
the Board before the April 27, 2015 hearing . See Ex . 5 , Petitioner's counsel ’ s letter to the Board
( April 23 , 2015 ) ( listing all exhibits
and Exhibit List Submitted on Behalf olj
submitted to the Board ).

8
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Through taking advantage of therapy, substance abuse treatment, and programming,
education and work opportunities the Department of Corrections and Community

Supervision [ hereinafter DOCCS] offers, Ms.

has made progress in addressing

the factors that contributed to her crime. See Ex. 4 at 7 (“Ms.

has appeared to

have gained considerable insight into her psychiatric illness and substance abuse, her
responsibility for the instant offense, and the influence of her past trauma on her past
substance abuse and abusive behavior.”). In addition, Ms.

^

for causing the death of
j
|

See Ex. 4 at 7 (“Ms.

feels deep remorse
demonstrates

empathy and remorse for her past behaviors and has exhibited self-control and adaptive
coping skills while incarcerated.”).
Ms.

entered prison with severe mental illness and drug addiction.

Shortly after her arrest, she was diagnosed with Major Depression (with psychotic

-

features), Anxiety Disorder, (features of ) Chronic Post Traumatic Stress Disorder, and

Somataform Disorder. See Ex. 6, Clinical and Forensic Psychologist Report by Dr.
Sanford L. Drob, Ph.D. March 10, 1997, at 20. At the time of her offense, Ms.

was also found to be experiencing depression, hallucinations, and difficulties
distinguishing between fantasy and reality. See Ex. 7, Psychiatric Evaluation by Dr.
Seymour Halleck, M.D., March 17, 1997, at 12. She was also addicted to cocaine and

alcohol. See Ex. 4, at 3. As a result of sexual abuse Ms.

suffered as a young

child, she had “an extraordinary capacity to dissociate herself from her surroundings and

block out her painful thoughts and affects from consciousness.” Ex. 6 at 20. Although
Ms.

death ofj

does not contend that her diagnoses rendered her not responsible for the

—she accepts full responsibility—her seriously compromised
9
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-

mental health contributed to the ever increasing neglect and maltreatment of
which ultimately caused her death. While in prison, Ms.

^^

has taken

advantage of every opportunity to address the psychological issues that contributed to her

crime. Today, Ms.

mental state is sound and she no longer suffers from the

1. Her alcohol and

delusions that contributed to the neglect that caused

cocaine dependency issues are in “sustained remission,” and her Major Depressive
Disorder and Post-traumatic Stress Disorder are in “full remission.” Ex. 4 at 6. In
addition, although the Board would not permit Ms|

to express her insight and

remorse at the hearing, the statement she attempted to make communicates deep remorse
and insight. Ex. 8, Personal Statement of

|, April 27, 2015.2

In addition to therapy and substance abuse treatment, Ms.

has pursued

programming to help her gain further insight into her crime and the behavior that led to

her crime. Ms.

has done so well in these programs that she has been given

leadership roles in several of them . These include the “Alternatives to Violence” Program
( AVP); “Anger and You ”; and the Aggression Replacement Training ( ART) ( which she

completed successfully and eventually became a facilitator for the program ). See Ex. 9,
Certificates from Programs and Training Completed.
During her incarceration, Ms.

has taken the initiative to further her

education. Due in part to her struggles with the sexual abuse she experienced as a child,

see Ex . 4 at 2, in her teenage years Ms.

became pregnant and dropped out of

high school . Once at Bedford Hills, Ms.

worked hard to close the gaps in her

2

to make her full statement ; instead, the Board
The Board would not permit Ms
directed her to give her written statement to her counselor for faxing to the Board. See Ex. 1 at 7provided the written statement , Ex. 8, to her counselor on the day of the
8. Ms.
hearing, but she does not know if it was ever faxed to the Board or considered by the Board.

10
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education and earned a High School Equivalency diploma in June 1999. See Ex. 10, High

School Equivalency Diploma and Good Business Student Certificate. She has continued
to further her education by completing a General Business Course. Id .

M si

also presented the Board with comprehensive reentry plans

despite the certainty of being deported to

a country where she has not resided

since she was a young child. See Ex. 5 at 8. Although Ms.

was a legal

permanent resident of the United States at the time of her crime, due to the nature of her

crime, a deportation order was issued against her on June 4, 1998, and on March 16,

1999, she was ordered to be removed from the US. See Ex. 11, Removal Documents. In
light of this reality, Ms.

has arranged, if she is released, to reside at

|; from there, she plans to work with social workers
to find long-term housing, healthcare, employment, and counseling services. In addition,

Ms.

who has offered to pick Ms.

has a cousin in

|up at the

airport, and assist her with housing, employment, and emotional support. See Ex. 12,

-

Post Release Plan by

|, LMSQ, LCSW, and

Finally, both the COMPAS and the individualized psychological evaluation

conclude that Ms.

is at the lowest risk of engaging in violence or reoffending.

Over the last 19 years, Ms.

has used what she has learned from therapy,

programming, education and work to become a thoughtful and insightful woman. The
individualized psychological report provided to the Board concluded that “Ms.
appears to have little risk for future violence or general criminal behavior if

released into the community on parole.” Ex. 4 at 7. Moreover, DOCCS’ own risk

assessment tool concluded that Ms.

has the lowest risk of future felony

11
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violence, arrest, and absconding. See Ex. 13, 2015 COMPAS Assessment. In addition ,
the COMPAS places Ms.
amount of supervision

on a supervision status of 4, which requires the least

—a strong indication that Ms.

is ready to be

reintegrated into society with minimal risk to society’s welfare and minimal risk of
reoffending. Id.

The decision denying parole was short and contained primarily statutory language
and lists of statutory factors the Board stated it “considered” or “noted.” In denying

parole, the Board cited the statutory standards of: “incompatibility with the welfare of
society” and “release would deprecate the seriousness of the crime so as to undermine
respect for law.” See Ex. 1 at 12. The Board then listed statutory factors it stated it

“considered .” Id . The Board then stated that “the callous disregard [Ms.

had

[Ms.

for

|]

was “more compelling.” Id.

The Board cited additional facts of the crime: “During that time you observed

deteriorate and did not seek medical attention. You also waited several hours to

call 911 when you discovered

was dead.” Id. The Board then “noted” several

items, including letters of support and certificates of accomplishment, that Ms.

submitted to the Board and then concluded by stating, “[a]ll factors considered, your
release at this time is not appropriate.” Id. at 13.

12
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ARGUMENT

I.

THE BOARD’S DECISION WAS IMPERMISSIBLY CONCLUSORY AND
LACKING IN DETAIL

The Board was required to explain in detail its conclusion that Ms.
release would be incompatible with the welfare of society and its conclusion that release
would so deprecate the seriousness of the offense so as to undermine respect for law,3 but

it failed to explain either conclusion. See Ex. 1 at 12-13; Executive Law §259-i (2)(c)( A)
(“ If parole is not granted ... , the inmate shall be informed in writing ... of the factors and

reasons for such denial of parole. Such reasons shall be given in detail and not in
conclusory terms.”). The Board’s conclusion that release would be incompatible with the

welfare of society required the Board to explain why Ms.

had not rehabilitated

herself and thus posed a risk to community safety. The Board ’s conclusion that Ms.
release would so deprecate the seriousness of the offense so as to undermine
respect for law required the Board to explain why a longer period of incarceration is

necessary to preserve the moral credibility of or respect for the law. Instead, the Board

deemed Ms I

to have had “callous disregard” for|

|, provided facts

-

about the crime and then concluded “release at this time is not appropriate.” Ex . 1 at 12

13. Neither the crime alone, nor the Board ’s description of it as “callous,” explain why
Ms.

poses a risk to public safety if released nor does it, alone, explain why

11n its decision denying parole, the Board cited two of the three statutory standards it must apply
in determining parole. See N.Y. Exec. Law § 259-1 (c) (A) (The Board must determine “ if

—

there is a reasonable probability that, if such inmate is released , he will live and remain at liberty
without violating the law , and that his release is not incompatible with the welfare of society and
will not so deprecate the seriousness of his crime as to undermine respect for law .”).

13
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extension of Ms.

incarceration was necessary to prevent undermining

respect for the law. Cf Platten v. NYS Bd. of Parole , 47 Misc. 3d 1059, 1067 (Sup. Ct.

Sullivan Cnty. 2015); Rabenbauer v. N. Y. State Dept , of Corr. & Cmty. Supervision , 46

Misc. 3d 603, 612 (Sup. Ct. Sullivan Cnty. 2014 ); Ex. 14, Bruetsch v. N. Y. State Dept, of
Corr. & Cmty. Supervision , 43 Misc. 3d 1223(A), 2014 NY Slip Op 50755(U) at *5 (Sup.

Ct. Sullivan Cnty. 2014) (each finding a parole decision that recited facts of the offense
and consideration of statutorily required factors failed to explain why release would be

incompatible with the welfare to society and failed to explain why release would so

deprecate the seriousness of the offense as to undermine respect for the law).

The Board must concretely explain its reasons for denying parole because it is not
the Board’s role to “determine, in the abstract, the appropriate penalty for murder in
today's society.” See King v. New York State Div. of Parole , 190 A.D.2d 423, 432 (1993)

affd, 83 N.Y.2d 788 (1994) (“The role of the Parole Board is not to resentence petitioner
according to the personal opinions of its members as to the appropriate penalty for

murder, but to determine whether, as of this moment, given all the relevant statutory
factors, he should be released.”). The failure to explain in detail the Board’s reasons for
denying parole violates the positive requirements of the statute governing parole decision
making and thus requires annulment of the denial and a new hearing.
A. The Parole Board Failed to Explain Why Ms.
Incompatible with the Welfare of Society

By concluding that Ms.

Release Would be

release would be “incompatible with the

welfare of society,” id ., the Board was required to explain why Ms.

was not

rehabilitated. See Platten v. NYS Bd. of Parole, 47 Misc. 3d 1059, 1067 (Sup. Ct., NY
14
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Cnty. 2015) (“ Because the written decision lacks specificity, this Court is left with no

ability to evaluate why the Commissioners on the board denied parole. ”) (emphasis

added ). The incompatibility standard, one of three standards the Board must apply in

-

making parole decisions, Exec. Law § 259 I(c)( A), requires the Board to assess whether

is sufficiently rehabilitated. Such an assessment requires the Board to

Ms.

assess whether the factors that led to the commission of the crime, such as substance

abuse, for example, have been reformed . The assessment of reform is guided by the
nature of the crime, the nature of the offender and underlying causes for the crime. Here,

the nature of the crime and what led Ms.

to engage in “callous disregard” of

[, Ex. 1 at 12, defines the relevant reform which the Board must assess. The
Board did not, however, cite any reason

—such as lack of remorse or insight, a high

COMPAS risk assessment, a troubling prison disciplinary record, failure to participate in
prison programming or work, continuing mental health problems or an insufficient
reentry plan

—to explain its conclusion that release would pose a risk to community

safety.

Here, where the crime producing factors in Ms.

prior life were

reformed and the information before the Board established rehabilitation, the Board’s

failure to explain why it concluded Ms.

poses a threat to society renders its

decision arbitrary and capricious. First, where serious mental health problems and
substance abuse contributed significantly to the crime, the Board did not explain why,
despite undisputed evidence of sustained sobriety and full remission of prior mental
health diagnoses, Ms.

release would pose a danger to society. Second, the

Board specifically noted that in committing her crime, Ms.

15

displayed “callous
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Ex . 1 at 12; yet , in denying parole almost

disregard ... for |

twenty years later, the Board did not make any mention of Ms.

insight, factors relevant to assessing whether Ms.

changed. Third, the decision is silent as to why, despite Ms.

for establishing a stable life in her native country of|
community.4 Lastly, the Board failed to explain why Ms.

remorse or
previous callousness has

detailed plans
she poses a risk to the
positive COMPAS

evaluation, strong disciplinary record and work history, leadership positions, educational

attainment, and programming accomplished in prison did not establish strong
rehabilitation.
The Board need not write an opus, but it must provide some reasoning for its

conclusion that release would be incompatible with the welfare of society. See Flatten v.
NYS Bd. of Parole, 47 Misc. 3d 1059, 1067 (Sup. Ct., NY Cnty. 2015) (“The board in this

matter has failed to properly and specifically articulate any reasoning for its decision to
deny parole release... and therefore... the decision was arbitrary and capricious and to a
large extent, substantively unreviewablc.”); Ex. 15, Weinstein v. Dennison , 7 Misc. 3d
1009(A), 2005 NY Slip Op 50518( U) at *9 (Sup. Ct., NY Cnty. 2005) (“The Board 's

unfounded conclusory statement that ‘there is a reasonable probability that [petitioner]
would not live and remain at liberty without violating the law’ and that his ‘release is thus
not presently compatible with the public safety and welfare,’ is but an empty recitation of

the statutory exception. Without any reasons, much less the required detailed reasons, and

As argued infra , it is also inherently irrational for the Board to conclude that Ms|
poses a danger to society if released , yet fail to explain the society to which it refers in light of
Ms .
(inevitable deportation to |
4
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with a record which suggests otherwise, the finding is irrational bordering on
impropriety.”).
The seriousness of the crime, alone, does not explain why the Board concluded

Msl

poses a risk to community safety, except if the Board is signaling that Ms.
is beyond rehabilitation and the Board will forever see her release as

incompatible with the welfare of society. If this is the case, the Board must explain its
reasoning in detail , which is has not done.

1. Determination of Whether Release Would Be Incompatible with the
Welfare of Society Requires the Board to Assess Rehabilitation and the
Rehabilitation Assessed Must be Tethered to the Crime Producing Factors
that Led to Ms]
Crime

In determining whether Ms.

release would be incompatible with the

welfare of society, the Board must evaluate Ms.

rehabilitative progress to

gauge if she poses a danger to community safety if released. See Silmon v. Travis, 95
N.Y.2d 470, 477-78 (2000). In upholding the Parole Board ’s denial of parole, the Silmon

Court held that despite an underlying Alford plea that did not require petitioner to admit
his guilt, the Board could deny parole based on

..a very serious crime indicating a

propensity for extreme violence and indifference to the rights of others

[and]...[petitioner] did not accept responsibility for his actions, and ... he lacked remorse
and insight into the crime.” Id.at 474. The Court of Appeals reasoned that since the

incompatibility standard was an assessment whether petitioner presented a danger to the
community, and has “...a strong rehabilitative component,” remorse and insight were

relevant. Id. at 477; see also Wallman v. Travis, 18 A.D. 3d 304, 308 ( lsl Dep’ t. 2005)
(Finding a need to evaluate “rehabilitative progress” to determine whether there is a
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reasonable probability of reoffending and whether release is incompatible with welfare of

society.) 5
The nature of the rehabilitation the Board assesses must be related to the crime
producing factors that led Ms.

to so maltreat

that it resulted in

her death. See Ex. 16, Maye v. Russi , N.Y.L.J ., Feb. 5, 1996, at 33 (App. Div. 1 st Dep't

1996) (Finding the Board must articulate “the logical connection which demonstrates
why [ the inmate's] crime automatically translates into a ‘reasonable probability’ that the

[inmate] will break the law if released ....”); Walker v. New York Slate Div. of Parole , 203
A .D.2d 757 (3d Dep’ t. 1994) ( Finding release incompatible with the welfare of society
because the seriousness of shooting indiscriminately into a crowd, the failure to attend

violent behavior modification programs, and petitioner’s lack of insight and remorse
amounted to an unacceptable risk to community safety).
2. The Board Failed to Explain Why Ms.
Prior Mental Health
Problems and Substance Abuse Would Pose a Risk to Community Safety
When the Record Shows Ms.
Addressed Those Crime Producing
Factors and Both arc in Sustained Remission

The Parole Board failed to state why Ms.

[improved mental health

and sustained sobriety precluded her release from being compatible with the welfare of

society. Prior and current mental illness history are appropriate factors to consider, as

-

they relate directly to the statutory standards of Executive Law §259 i. See Silmon, 95

The rehabilitative thrust of parole decisions has only been enhanced since Silmon. See Thwaites
v. New York Slate Bd. Of Parole , 34 Misc.3d 694, 699 (Sup. Ct., Orange Cnty. 2011 ) (The 2011
amendments of Executive Law Sec. 259-c(4 ) require “Parole Boards [to] adopt and be guided by
procedures that require it to evaluate “rehabilitation.”); see also Ramirez v. Evans, 118 A.D.3d
707, 708 (2d Dep’t 2014); Montane v. Evans, 116 A.D.3d 197, 200 (3d Dep't 2014).
5
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N.Y.2d at 477. Moreover, at the time of the crime, Ms.

was suffering from

mental trauma stemming from sexual abuse in her childhood , see Ex. 4 at 6, as well as

severe undiagnosed mental illness and substance abuse. Id . at 2. Since then, she has

addressed her mental health issues and her prior diagnoses are in full remission. Id at 6.

Ms.

has also addressed her substance abuse problem through treatment

programs and her abuse of drugs and alcohol is in sustained remission. Id.
3. The Board Failed to Explain Why it Concluded Release would be
Incompatible with Community Safety , yet DOCCS’ Own Risk Assessment
Determined Ms.
was at the Lowest Risk for Violence, Arrest and
Absconding.

DOCCS’ own risk evaluation tool concluded Ms.

is at the lowest risk

for felony violence, arrest and absconding. See Ex. 13, 2015 COMPAS Assessment. The
COMPAS risk assessment recommended the lowest possible supervision level. Id. All of
these factors demonstrate concrete rehabilitation. Despite this record, the Board did not
explain why it concluded Ms.

release would pose a danger to the community

and thus be incompatible with the welfare of society.

4. Insight and Remorse arc Relevant Factors in Determining Whether
Release is Incompatible with the Welfare of Society, Yet the Board Did Not
Mention Either.

The Board’s decision does not address Ms.

remorse or insight, which

is relevant to the issue of rehabilitation. See Silmon , 95 N.Y.2d at 477. Yet, there was
information before the Board explaining Ms.
individualized psychological evaluation concluded Ms.
See Ex. 4 at 7 (“ Ms.

insight and remorse. First, the

|had gained insight.

has appeared to have gained considerable insight into her
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psychiatric illness and substance abuse, her responsibility for the instant offense, and the
influence of her past trauma on her past substance abuse and abusive behavior.”). The
evaluation also concluded that “Ms.

demonstrates empathy and remorse for

her past behaviors and has exhibited self-control and adaptive coping skills while
incarcerated.” Id. In addition , Ms.

attempted to explain her remorse through a

personal statement she prepared for the hearing. Ex. 7, Personal Statement of|

|, Submitted for April 27, 2015 Parole Hearing (“ I appear today before you
with honesty, remorse, compassion, great respect and understanding for human life.”).
Her personal statement also explained that, although she sought to explain to the Board
death, she was “not excusing [her]

who she was at the time she caused

crime or refusing to take any responsibility for [her] actions.” Id.6 The Board did not,

however, explain why, despite strong evidence of insight and remorse, it concluded Ms.

posed a risk to public safety.
Upon Her Release, it Was
Will Be Deported to
5. Since Ms.
Irrational for the Board to Fail to Explain Why Release Would Be
Incompatible with Society But Not Define the Society to Which It Referred

In light of Ms.
conclusion that Ms.

|s inevitable deportation to

the Board’s

release would be “incompatible with the welfare of

society,” without explanation, begs the question, which society
defies logic that Ms.

It

release will be inconsistent with the welfare of New

York society or any community in the United States since she will be deported and

6

tried to make this personal statement to the Board, but was prohibited from
Ms.
doing so by Commissioner Elovich. Ex . 1 at 7-8. Ms.
provided the written statement ,
to her counselor, but she does not know if it was ever faxed to the Board or considered by the
Board .
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ineligible to return to the United States for twenty years. See Immigration and Nationality
Act, §212(a )(9)(A)(i); see also Ex. 11, Removal Documents. In addition, the Board

failed to explain why Ms.

|comprehensive and detailed plans for establishing

once released are incompatible with the welfare of any society.

a life in

To the extent the Board ’s decision reflects an unstated determination that release

would be incompatible with the welfare of society because it may be impossible to

transfer parole supervision to
detail. Ms.

|, the Board is required to explain such a reason in

presented the Board with a detailed reentry plan for life in |

She found housing, and a family member will provide financial and emotional support
and also help Ms.

lived in

with finding employment. Though Ms.

since she was a child, she took the necessary steps to establish a stable life

upon release. See Ex. 12, Post-Release Plan . In light of Ms|
deportation to

has not

inevitable

ind realistic plans for establishing a stable life there, the Board ’s

failure to explain why her release would be incompatible with the welfare of society, and

the relevant society, renders the decision arbitrary and capricious.
6. The Board Failed to Explain Why Despite All Ollier Relevant Factors
Release Would be
Evincing Rehabilitation, it Concluded Ms.|
Incompatible With the Welfare of Society

All other relevant statutory factors are positive and do not raise any reasons to
believe Ms.

is not rehabilitated; therefore, it was incumbent on the Board to

explain why it concluded otherwise. Ms.

program history is extensive and

positive. In addition to DOCCS programming (e.g. Alternatives to Violence, Anger and

You and Aggression Replacement Training), See Ex . 9, Certificates from Programs and
Training Completed , she took advantage of numerous programs offered by outside
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agencies such as the Center for Urban Community Services’ Wellness Self- Management

Class and My Sister’s Place’s Substance Abuse and Domestic Violence program for

which she received the Pillar of Strength Award. Id. Ms.

completed her

General Education Degree, a General Business Program, see Ex . 10, High School

Equivalence Diploma and Good Business Student Certificate, and Phases I, II and III of
the Even Start Family Literacy Program, which focused on adult education and parenting
education, see Ex. 9. At the time of the hearing, Ms.

was in a leadership

position working as a facilitator for the Aggression Replacement Training.7 Ex. 5, Letter
to Parole Board and Exhibit List Submitted on Behalf of I

|, April 23,

2015, at 5. The Board had before it an exemplary disciplinary record; the last incident

was over 8 years ago, for smoking in an unauthorized area. See Ex. 17, Ms.

Disciplinary Record. Ms.

leveloped positive interpersonal relationships with

correctional officers, staff. See Ex. 18, Support Letters from Staff and Corrections
Officers , at 2 (“Her growth and rehabilitation shows that she can re-enter into society
and be productive.”). Ms|

programming, work, education and disciplinary

record, as well as her interpersonal relationships with correctional staff and other
incarcerated women do not demonstrate that her release would pose a risk to community

safety. See Ex. 18; see also Ex. 19, Support Letters from Other Incarcerated Women.

The Board must explain the basis upon which it reached the conclusion Ms.

is

not rehabilitated and thus release would be incompatible with the welfare of society.

7

was transferred to Albion Correctional Facility in November, 2015 , a medium
Ms .
security prison, after 19 years at Bedford Hills Correctional Facility, a maximum security prison;
therefore, she no longer holds this work assignment .
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B. The Parole Board Failed to Explain Why Ms.
Release Would So
Deprecate the Seriousness of the Crime as to Undermine Respect for the Law
The Parole Board also failed to explain in detail why Ms.

release

would so deprecate the seriousness of her crime as to undermine respect for the law. The
Board concluded that Msj

release would cause this result, but it did not

explain the basis for its conclusion. The Parole Board’s mere restatement of the facts of
offense may explain the seriousness of the offense, but the statutory

standard cited by the Board requires more. The statute requires the Board to explain why
release to parole supervision after 19 years of incarceration would undermine respect for

the law. The standard requires the Board to determine whether Ms|

should

serve additional time and if so, why such additional time is necessary to avoid
undermining the moral credibility of the law. Put another way, the Board must explain
why the punishment meted out so far is not enough. Instead, the Board wrote two

sentences about the crime, which established the seriousness of the crime, but did not

with a detailed and non-conclusory

meet the Board’s burden of providing Ms.

explanation for why release after 19 years would undermine respect for the law.
1. The Parole Board’s Mere Restatement of the Facts of Ms.
Offense is not a Sufficient Explanation as to Why Release
Would Deprecate the Seriousness of the Crime as to Undermine
Respect for the Law.

The Parole Board’s mere restatement of the facts of Ms.

offense is

statutorily insufficient to meet the Board’s obligation to provide a detailed explanation

for denial of parole release. The Board ’s reason for denying parole must contain

sufficient specificity to permit a court to evaluate why the Board denied parole. See

Platten v. NYS Bd. of Parole , 47 Misc. 3d 1059, 1067 ( N. Y. Sup. Ct. Sullivan Cnty
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2015). Absent such explanation, this Court has no way to determine whether the Board is
exercising its personal opinion or appropriately applying the statutory standards. See King
v. New York State Div. of Parole , 190 A.D.2d 423, 432 (1993 ) affd, 83 N. Y.2d 788
( 1994) (“The role of the Parole Board is not to resentence petitioner according to the

personal opinions of its members as to the appropriate penalty for murder, but to

determine whether, as of this moment, given all the relevant statutory factors, he should
be released.”).

In Flatten, the court held the Board’s denial of petitioner’s release was arbitrary
and capricious because the Board merely stated the statutory factors required then
concluded, without explanation, that release to parole would be incompatible with society
and deprecate the seriousness of the offense, and listed the factors it considered . Id. at

164. In denying Ms.

parole, the Board similarly concluded that Ms.

release would deprecate the seriousness of the crime and be incompatible
with the welfare of society and then merely listed the statutory factors it considered and
deemed her to have had “callous disregard ” for|

based on the facts of the

offense. The Board’s decision does, therefore, outline why Ms.

offense was

serious, a contention no one disputes. However, there are no self-evident truths that

explain parole denials. The Parole Board failed to explain why Ms.
incarceration for 19 years of a 15 year to life sentence would not sufficiently express
condemnation of Msl

conduct. A detailed explanation for why release would

so deprecate the seriousness of the offense so as to undermine respect for law must
require the Board to explain why an offender such as Ms.

whose crime was

fueled by severe mental illness, which is in full remission, and substance abuse, which is
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in sustained remission, needs to be further incarcerated to prevent the appearance that the
law did not sufficiently condemn Ms.

:rime. Although the Board claimed to

have considered all the statutory factors, but determined the seriousness of the crime was

“more compelling,” this conclusion does not explain why, despite the seriousness of the
offense, release after serving four years more than the minimum sentence permitted by

condemning murder. An

law , would weaken respect for the laws of ]

explanation was especially not self-evident in light of the sentencing judge’s imposition

of the minimum sentence which permits release after serving 15 years.8 Because the
Board provided no explanation

—

—

which this Court can evaluate for why Ms.

release would run afoul of the statutory deprecate standard, the Board failed

to meet its statutory burden of providing the reasons for Ms.

tarole denial

“in detail and not in conclusory terms.” See N.Y. Exec. Law § 259-i(2)(a)(i ).
Describing Ms.

offense as callous adds no explanation for why her

release would deprecate the seriousness of the crime. Beyond the seriousness of the

offense, inherent in all murder convictions, there must be some aggravating factor for
which parole is denied. See Platten , 47 Misc.3d. at 1065. In Platten, the court described

the petitioner’s crime as “heinous,” id., meaning “grossly wicked or reprehensible,” The
American Heritage College Dictionary, 200 (3d. ed. 1993), yet still held the denial of

parole arbitrary and capricious because the Board’s decision did not explain why release
would be inconsistent with the welfare of society or deprecate the seriousness of the

8

Petitioner does not contend that the sentencing judge’s imposition of the minimum sentence
indicates a favorable parole recommendation, see Duffy v. N.Y. State Div. of Parole , 74 A .D. 3d
965, 966 (2d Dep’ t 2010), but it does indicate that the sentencing judge determined it would be
appropriate to consider release to parole supervision after 15 years of incarceration .
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offense. Likewise, the Board described Ms.

offense as “callous,” Ex. 1 at 12 ,

meaning “emotionally hardened; unfeeling,” The American Heritage College Dictionary,

200 (3d. ed. 1993), but does not actually explain why the Board believes Ms.
release would deprecate the seriousness of the offense or why her release
would undermine respect for law. There is nothing inherent in a word meaning
“emotionally hardened” or “unfeeling” which gives any clue as to how much time in

prison is enough given the seriousness of the offense or how much time in prison would

be required to preserve respect for the law. Therefore, because the characterization of Ms.

offense as callous does not explain why release after almost two decades of
incarceration would deprecate the seriousness of her offense or undermine respect for the
law, the Board’s failure to provide a detailed non-conclusory explanation for Ms.

parole denial necessitates that this Court grant Ms.

a de novo

hearing.

2. The Parole Board Failed to Explain Why, Given Ms. |
Rehabilitation of the Significant Mental Health and Substance Abuse
Problems that Fueled her Crime, Release Would So Deprecate the
Seriousness of the Offense as to Undermine Respect for the Law.

The Parole Board failed to explain why, in light of Ms.

strong

rehabilitation, release would so deprecate the seriousness of her offense as to undermine
respect for the law. Although it is undisputed that absent rehabilitation, release of an

offender would undermine respect for the law , see Edward R . Hammock and James F.
Seelandt, New York's Sentencing and Parole Law: An Unanticipated and Unacceptable

-

Distortion of the Parole Boards' Discretion, 13 St. John's J. Legal Comment. 527, 536 37
( 1999), when there is rehabilitation, especially when such rehabilitation addressed the

very factors that contributed so fundamentally to the crime, the need to explain why
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despite this rehabilitation, more punishment is needed is readily apparent. Cf supra Part
l. A .2. Ms.

suffered from then- undiagnosed severe mental illnesses and

substance abuse problems which contributed to her offense. Ex. 4, at 7. Ms.
however, is not a psychopath. Id. Through treatment and counseling over the course of 19

years of incarceration , Ms|

no longer suffers from the delusions that

contributed to her offense, her Post Traumatic Stress Disorder and Major Depressive
Disorder are in full remission, and her cocaine and alcohol abuse are in sustained

remission. See id. at 6. Yet despite Ms.

rehabilitation of the conditions that

directly contributed to her offense, the Parole Board merely recited the statutory standard
that release would deprecate the seriousness of the offense and would undermine respect

for the law without explaining why release of a rehabilitated individual after serving
more than her minimum sentence would undermine respect for the law, or, in the

alternative, why Ms.

must serve at least two more years to avoid undermining

respect for the law.9
3. The Parole Board Failed to Explain Why, Given Ms.
Remorse and Insight into her Crime, Release Would so Deprecate the
Seriousness of her Offense as to Undermine Respect for the Law.

Ms.

ability to clearly explain her remorse and insight into her crime

demonstrates not only that she has made tremendous rehabilitative progress, but also that

release at this time would not deprecate the seriousness of her offense. Remorse and
insight into criminal acts is relevant to a Parole Board’s consideration of whether a parole

incarceration of over 19 years, beyond the minimum of her 15 year to
Given Ms.
analysis
offenseremaining for the Parole Board is whether Ms.
life sentence, the
contributing conditions have been rehabilitated, see Hammock and Seelandt , supra , at 536-37,
and if so, why her release would undermine respect for the law .
9
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applicant’s release would so deprecate the seriousness of the crime as to undermine
respect for the law . See Matter of Philips v. Dennison , 41 A.D.3d 17, 23 (1st Dept 2007).

In Philips, the court found that the Board was within its discretion to deny parole to a
former New York City police officer convicted of murdering two people because he did

not show remorse for committing the crime or for the people he killed, refused to admit
to the basic facts of the offense, showed a lack of insight into the offense, and only

showed remorse for the impact his offense had on his own life. Id. In contrast, Ms.
was prevented from making a personal statement in which she sought to

express remorse for the victim of the offense. Ex. l at 8. Despite not being permitted to
make her statement expressing remorse, Ms.

articulated her remorse and her

insight into her crime when she said to the Board: “... throughout the years I have worked
very hard to try and understand how I could commit such an act.” Id. Had she been

allowed to make her full personal statement, she would have freely and without
prompting told the Board that she appeared before them with “honesty, remorse,

compassion, and great respect and understanding for human life.” See Ex. 8, Personal
Statement ofl

addition, Ms.

|, Submitted for April 27, 2015, Parole Hearing.

In

would have expressed to the Board, “There is no excuse for

-

death. I accept my responsibility.. . ” Id. at 1 2. Also unlike in Philips, Ms.

admitted her conduct and crime. See Ex. 1 at 5. As the ability to express
remorse and demonstrate insight into one’s crime is relevant to whether parole release

would deprecate the seriousness of an applicant’s offense or undermine respect for the
law, the Board failed to meet its duty to provide a detailed non-conclusory explanation

for parole denial because the Board failed to explain why Ms.
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insight into her offense were insufficient, such that her release would cause deprecation

of the seriousness of her offense or loss of respect for or moral authority of the law.
The Board also failed to explain why respect for the law would be undermined or
the seriousness of Ms.
despite ]

|release,

offense deprecated by Ms.

remorse and insight into her crime, as described in her April 22,

2015, psychological evaluation, above and beyond that expressed in her interview with
the Board on April 27, 2015. In contrast to the petitioner’s responses in Philips, Ms.

|April 22, 2015, psychological evaluation states “Ms.

talked

openly about the instant offense and her history and appeared sincere, remorseful,

empathic, and accepted responsibility for the instant offense and the impact her actions

had on her family.” See Ex. 4 at 5. The report further states that Ms.

“demonstrates empathy and remorse for her past behaviors.” Id. at 7. The Board failed to
meet its burden to provide a detailed non-conclusory explanation for Ms.
parole denial because, despite the relevance remorse and insight has to whether release

would so deprecate the seriousness of the offense as to undermine respect for the law, the

Board failed to explain why Ms|

release would deprecate and undermine

despite the remorse and insight reported in her April 22, 2015, psychological evaluation.

Thus, the Court must grant Ms|

a de novo parole hearing because,

given the contents of the parole interview minutes, Ms|
and Ms.

parole submission,

written statement, the Parole Board failed to explain why Ms.

release after her incarceration of 19 years of a 15 year to life sentence would
deprecate the seriousness of her offense or undermine respect for the law.
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II .

THE PAROLE BOARD’S DECISION WAS ARBITRARY AND
CAPRICIOUS BECAUSE IT DID NOT CONSIDER ALL RELEVANT
STATUTORY FACTORS

The Parole Board neglected to give due consideration to Ms.

stable

mental health and sustained sobriety; her strong prison record; her detailed reentry plan
{that took into account certain deportation to a country she last knew as a child); and the

support of her New York family, who, as the grandparents, siblings and uncle of|
were also victims of Ms.

crime.

Instead, the Parole Board mustered merely a “passing reference” to the relevant
factors to which the Board must give due consideration.10 See King v. N , Y. State Div. of

Parole , 190 A.D.2d 423, 433 (1st Dept 1993), affd , 83 N.Y.2d 788 (1994) (“...passing
mention in the Parole Board’s decision of petitioner’s rehabilitative achievements cannot

serve to demonstrate that the Board weighed or fairly considered the statutory factors

where... it appears that such achievements were mentioned only to dismiss them in light
of the seriousness of the petitioner’s crime.”). The decision stated:

The Board has considered your institutional adjustment, including discipline and
program participation. Required statutory factors have been considered , including
your risk to society, rehabilitation efforts, and your needs for successful reentry
into the community. Your release plans have also been considered.
10

The relevant factors the Board must consider are: (i) the institutional record including program
goals and accomplishments, academic achievements, vocational education, training or work
assignments, therapy and interpersonal relationships with staff and inmates; ...(iii) release plans
including community resources, employment, education and training and support services
available to the inmate; . .. (iv) any deportation order issued by the federal government against the
inmate while in the custody of the department and any recommendation regarding deportation
made by the commissioner of the department pursuant to section one hundred forty-seven of
correction law; (v) any statement made to the Board by the crime victim or the victim’s
representative, where the crime victim is deceased or is mentally or physically
incapacitated; ... ( vii) the seriousness of the offense with due consideration to the type of sentence,
length of sentence and recommendations of the sentencing curt, the district attorney, the attorney
for the inmate, the presentence probation report as well as consideration of any mitigating and
aggravating factors, and activities following arrest prior to confinement; and ( viii ) prior criminal
record, including the nature and pattern of offenses, adjustment to any previous probation or
parole supervision and institutional confinement .” Executive Law 259 i( 2)(c)(A).

-
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This listing of factors amounts to no more than a passing reference rather than due

consideration.
Later in the decision, the Board listed additional factors it “noted:”

-

The Board notes your well prepared parole packet , 1PA, ART, AVP,
letters of support, letters from staff, deportation order and certificates of
accomplishment. The Board also notes your family support and personal
statement.

Ex. 1 at 13. Again, however, a list of factors the Board “noted ” is does not indicate the
Board weighed or fairly considered the information. Mention of the contents of the “well-

prepared parole packet” serves only to acknowledge that the Board received the packet,11

not that it considered the information in the packet. In addition, the Board does not claim
to have considered the statutory factors; the Board claims only to have “noted” such

factors. To “note” the existence of information does not rise to the statutory requirement
that the information be “considered, ” which requires the relevant information be

weighed, studied and thought about.
The Board’s decision was arbitrary and capricious because it failed to consider all

the statutory factors, and therefore a de novo hearing is warranted . See Ex. 20, Pulinario
v. N.Y. State Dept, of Corr. and Cmty. Supervision , 42 Misc. 3d 1232(A) (Sup. Ct. NY
Cnty. 2014)(granting a new hearing where the Board only made a perfunctory mention of

the statutory factors without an explanation why the seventeen year old crime outweighed
the voluminous evidence in petitioner’s favor).

11

The Board’s description of the packet as “ well-prepared ” is more of a compliment to the
~'
attorneys rather than evincing the Board considered the
organizational skills of Ms.

contents of the packet .
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A.

There is No Evidence in the Hearing Transcript or Decision that the
Board Gave Due Consideration to Several of the Required Statutory

Factors
The Board was required to consider “ programming goals and accomplishments,”
“therapy,” “any statement made to the Board by the crime victim or the victim’s

representative, where the crime victim is deceased or is mentally or physically
incapacitated,” “and any deportation order issued by the federal government against the

inmate while in the custody of the department and any recommendation regarding

deportation made by the commissioner of the department pursuant to section one hundred

-

forty seven of correction law.” See Executive Law 259-i(2)(c)(A). The Board neglected
to give due consideration to all of these factors.

1. Ms.
Mental Health and Substance Abuse Issues were
Integrally Intertwined with her Crime, yet the Board did not give her
Current Mental Health and Sobriety the Consideration it was Due.

Ms.

mental health and substance abuse issues were integrally

connected with her crime and were therefore critically relevant to whether, as of this
moment, given all the relevant statutory factors, Ms.

should be released. See

King v. New York State Div. of Parole , 190 A.D. 2d 423, 432 (1993) affd, 83 N.Y.2d 788
(1994) (“The role of the Parole Board is not to resentence petitioner according to the

personal opinions of its members as to the appropriate penalty for murder, but to
determine whether, as of this moment, given all the relevant statutory factors, he should

be released.”). Nevertheless, the Board did not give consideration to Ms.

progress in addressing her mental health and substance abuse issues, despite the strong

evidence that her mental health diagnoses are in full remission and her substance abuse is
in sustained remission. Ms.

began her incarceration with extensive mental
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health and substance abuse issues, and the Board spent extensive time during the hearing

questioning Ms.

about her use of drugs and her state of mind at the time of the

crime. Today, she is of sound mind and does not currently have active symptoms of
mental illness, and her drug dependency on cocaine is in sustained remission. See Ex. 4 at

6. Yet, the Board ’s decision did not even note these critical facts.

At the time of the crime, Ms.

was suffering from severe undiagnosed

mental illness and drug addiction. After her arrest, she was diagnosed with Major

Depression ( with psychotic features), Anxiety Disorder, ( features of ) Chronic Post

-

Traumatic Stress Disorder, and Somataform Disorder. At the time of her offense, Ms.

was found to be experiencing depression, hallucinations, and difficulties
distinguishing between fantasy and reality See Ex. 6 at 20; see Ex. 7 at 12.

Ms.

does not contend that her mental illness excuses her crime, but

that her mental health contributed to the conditions that made her crime possible. At the
time the crime was committed , Ms.

was experiencing intense psychological

distress, including delusions and dissociative flashbacks to her traumatic childhood, and
she was barely able to care for herself or for her surroundings. See Ex. 6. According to

the most recent psychological report, however, Ms.

success with treating her

mental health and substance abuse issues indicates there is a low risk of her reoffending.

Ms.

has “demonstrated numerous protective factors that further reduce the

likelihood of violence or re-offense.” Ex. 4 at 7. These protective factors include her
proactivity in seeking treatment, her insight into her psychiatric illnesses and substance

abuse issues, and her demonstrated remorse for her crime. Id. The psychological experts
concluded that Ms.

-

is likely to lead a law abiding life outside of prison
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-

because she has channeled the positive lessons she has learned through self reflection and

personal self- improvements by engaging in pro-social activities. These include teaching

pre-GED classes and facilitating therapeutic programs. Id, 12
Despite the turnaround Ms.

has achieved with her mental health, and

the uncontested evidence of rehabilitation Ms.

provided, the Board barely

acknowledged her progress, stating only that if she was released , “one of your conditions

would be to comply with any mental health referrals.” Ex. 1 at 4. In fact, when Ms.

-

stated that she had “taken one on-one therapy for over ten years,” the Board

gave no indication that they had heard Ms.

and understood the enormity of

this undertaking and the seriousness of Ms.

commitment to combating the

mental health issues that contributed to her crime. Id at 8. Instead, the Parole Board
submission to Parole. Id . Indeed,

recited a list of documents included in Ms.

the only reference the Board made to the individualized psychological report is
acknowledgement of receipt. Id at 4.
The Board’s lack of interest in Msj

mental health progress is striking

considering that the Board spent a significant portion of the hearing inquiring into her
mental health status at the time of her crime. Approximately four of the nine page hearing
transcript was devoted to a discussion of Ms.

substance abuse and mental

health issues at the time of the crime. See id. , 3-7. The Board asked what kinds of drugs

Ms.

was using, id. at 4; questioned her diagnosis of mental illness because the

12

The significance and utility of the individualized psychological evaluation is supported by the
COMPAS report , which suggested a “more in depth substance abuse assessment may be
prudent.” See Ex. 13, 2015 COMPAS Assessment . A more in depth assessment was done by
psychological experts who concluded that Ms.
substance abuse is in sustained
.
.
remission. Ex 4 at 7
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(although Ms|

Board contended she was able to care foi

who did most of the caretaking for

explained that it was
id. at 5; and asked Ms.

how she could be “of sound mind” toward

I, id. at 6.

but not the victim,

some ofl

Given the time the Board devoted to Ms.

previous mental state, and

the fact that the Board was provided with substantial documentation of Ms.
mental illness and substance abuse at the time of the crime, the dearth of questions about

her rehabilitation demonstrates it was not considered . The Board ’s mere recitation of the
materials in the Ms.

submission constitutes a “ passing reference” to a

required statutory factor. Accordingly, the Board’s decision was arbitrary and capricious

because the Board’s did not consider Ms.

current mental health status.

2. The Board was Required to Consider Statements of the Victim’s
Family But Nothing in the Hearing Record Demonstrates Such
Consideration

Victim Impact Statements were submitted to the Board , but there is no evidence

in the hearing record or decision that the Board considered such statements. Victim
representatives, siblings of|

|, sent statements to the Parole Board prior to the April

27, 2015, heal ing. See Ex. 21, Affirmation of Martha Rayner.13 The Board is statutorily
required to consider statements of the victim or the victim’s representatives where the

crime victim is deceased. See Executive Law 259-i(2)(c)(A). Although the Board must
keep the identity and the address of a person who provides a victim impact statement

exhibit, as well as exhibits 24 and 25 herein were submitted as part of Ms.
Administrative Appeal (See Ex. 2 herein).
13 This
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confidential, see Executive Law 259-i(2)(c)( B), the regulations do not require or
authorize the Board to hide consideration of such statements by omitting mention of such

-

statements in its decision. See Executive Law 259 i(2)(c)( A). Therefore, the absence of

any mention of consideration of the victim impact statement indicates such were not

considered.
3. The Board was Required to Consider DOCCS ’ Recommendations
Regarding Deportation but Did Not Do So.

The Board did not consider DOCCS’ recommendation regarding Ms.

deportation. DOCCS is required to compile a report on Ms.

past history and

its recommendations regarding deportation. See NY Correct. Law § 147. The Board is

required under both the Correction Law and Executive Law to consider this report. Id:,
Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A). The hearing transcript and decision do not evince that
such a report was before the Board and considered by the Board.

B.

The Board Demonstrates that It Did Not Considered Certain
Statutory Factors Because It’s Decision is Wholly Inconsistent with
Such Factors

The Board’s statement that it considered Ms.

participation in prison

programming, her education and work history, and her post-release plans defies logic

since the Board’s conclusion that Ms.

release would be incompatible with

the welfare of society, a standard that assesses rehabilitation, is wholly inconsistent with
the strong facts of rehabilitation before the Board.
One of the statutory standards cited by the Board in its decision denying parole

was that “release would be incompatible with the welfare of society.” See Ex. 1 at 12.
This standard requires the Board to assess whether Ms.

has been rehabilitated.

See Silmon, 95 N.Y.2d at 477-78. Yet , despite strong evidence of rehabilitation
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according to both DOCCS’s own internal assessments and those submitted by Ms.

|her COMPAS assessment, her current psychological evaluations, her

-

proactivity in her prison programming, her education, and in planning for her post release

the Board concluded Msl

when she is deported to

was not

rehabilitated. See supra, Section IIA. The Board could not have concluded Ms.

|posed a danger to society if it had genuinely considered the facts of
rehabilitation.

1. The Board’s Decision That Ms.
was Not
Rehabilitated is Inconsistent with Ms.
Proactively Seeking Therapeutic Programs and
Opportunities for Rehabilitation Above and Beyond the

EM

.

Programs DOCCS Offers

>ses a threat to the welfare of

The Board’s conclusion that Ms.

society is inconsistent with her proactive participation in opportunities for self-

improvement above and beyond that required by DOCCS. Ms]

has both

participated and adopted a leadership role in the therapeutic programs offered by

DOCCS, including “Alternatives to Violence” (AVP), “Anger and You,” and Aggression
Replacement Training (ART) ( which she completed successfully and eventually became

a facilitator for the program ). See Ex. 9, Certificates from Programs and Training
Completed. In addition, Ms.

completed the Center for Urban Community

-

Services’s Wellness Self Management Classes and received the Pillar of Strength Award

from My Sister’s Place for successful completion of its Substance Abuse and Domestic

Violence Workshop. Id.
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Msl

has also worked to remediate her relationship with

|who were also victimized by her crime. She has completed counseling
programs with her children to address their issues of anger and abandonment and to
strengthen her relationship with them. Id. She has taken parenting classes and has

completed a program for parents whose children were in foster care. Id.
Unlike her mental health and substance abuse treatment, the Board did ask Ms.
a few questions about the programming she completed. The Board asked Ms.

which program was most significant and what did she learn from it. See Ex. 1,
Parole Hearing Transcript and Decision, at 9. Although the Board stated during the
hearing that it would consider all the information Ms|

submitted, id. at 2, the

participation in programs in its decision. See Id.

Board merely “notes” Ms.

at 13 (“The Board notes your well prepared parole packet, IPA, ART, AVP, letters of
support, letters from staff, deportation order and certificates of accomplishment”).

Mentioning Ms.

participation in programs does not demonstrate that the

Board gave these factors the consideration they were due under Executive Law 259-

i(2)(c)(A)(i), which requires the Board to consider a petitioner’s “program goals and
accomplishments.”
2. The Board ’s Conclusion that Ms.
Poses a Risk to
Community Safety is Inconsistent with Her Educational
Accomplishments.

The Board ’s conclusion that Msl

was not rehabilitated evinced by its

conclusion that release would be incompatible with the welfare of society is inconsistent
with Ms.

educational attainment and work history. Per Executive Law 259-

i(2)(c)(A), educational attainment is one of the factors the Board must consider in
38
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rendering its decision. Pursuit of higher education is strongly correlated with reduced

recidivism. Although Ms.

|, due to childhood trauma, dropped out of high

school when she became pregnant, while incarcerated, she took the initiative to further
her education. She earned a High School Equivalency diploma in June 1999. See Ex. 10.
She then completed a General Business course. See id. Yet, the Board nowhere
acknowledges Msj

educational achievements. The Board only states that it

has “certificates of completion,” Ex. 1 at 8, and it “notes” “certificates of

accomplishment.” in its decision Id. at 13.

Had the Board inquired into Ms|

educational history, they would

have learned that she made formal education a priority during her incarceration. Ms.

continuing interest and efforts to pursue higher education is particularly
significant because education is highly correlated with reduced recidivism.14 Inmates
attending higher education classes while incarcerated are less likely to return to prison

after release. 15 See Ex. 22, Matter of Rios v. New York State Div. of Parole , 15 Misc. 3d
1107 (A), 2007 NY Slip Op 50529(U) at *4 ( holding that the mere passing mention of

petitioner’s accomplishments, including two degrees earned while incarcerated, does not

demonstrate fair considered of the record and thus constitutes failure to consider). Here,

as in Rios, the Board never acknowledged Ms.

which indicates the Board did not weigh and consider Ms.

educational achievements,

academic

achievements as they were required to do under Executive Law §259-i(2)(c)( A )( i ).

14

A comprehensive meta -analysis demonstrated that there is a significant positive correlation
between post-secondary correctional education and the reduction of recidivism. Cathryn A.
Chappel, Post - Secondary Correctional Education and Recidivism ; A Meta - Analysis of Research
Conducted 1990- 1999 , Journal of Correctional Education, Vol . 55, No. 2 (June 2004 ), 1480169.
15
James S . Vacca, Educated Prisoners Are Less Likely to Return to Prison , Journal of
Correctional Education, Vol . 55 , No. 4 ( Dec. 2004), 297-305 .
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3. The Board ’s Conclusion that Release Was Incompatible with the
Welfare of Society is Inconsistent with Ms.
iubmission of
Comprehensive Post Release Plans.

-

The Board’s decision is inconsistent with Ms.

comprehensive and

detailed post-release plans. Despite the fact that Ms.

paces deportation to a

country in which she has not resided since she was a young child, she provided a detailed

post-release plan to the Board. See Ex. 12 Post-Release Plan Letter by Kathy Ho, LMSQ,

LCSW, and Frances Lawall . Nevertheless, the Board failed to meaningfully consider Ms.
post-release in rendering its decision.

Ms|

was a permanent legal resident of the United States at the time of

her crime. Following her conviction, a deportation order was entered against her. See Ex.
10, Removal Documents. Upon release to parole, Ms|

would be placed in

Immigration and Customs Enforcement detention to await immediate deportation to

|, from which she immigrated at age nine. See Ex. 5 at 8.

Ms.

deportation order is final. See Ex. 10 at 1 (March 16, 1999 Immigration Appeal decision
states: “ We further find no error in the Immigration Judge’s determination that the

respondent is statutorily ineligible for cancellation of removal .”). Further, given her
conviction, Ms.

|is inadmissible to the U.S. pursuant to Immigration and

Nationality Act, §212(a)(9)(A).

In light of this unalterable situation, Ms.

arranged to reside at

would provide access to housing, food ,
clothing, and social workers who would help Ms.

healthcare, and employment . In addition, the

find long-temi housing,

|, which

assists women who have suffered violence, would provide a wide range of services,
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including counseling, support groups, and training classes, and provide referrals for Ms.
to obtain permanent housing, healthcare, and employment. Ex . 12 at 1 .

-

Although Executive Law 259 1 (2)(c)(A) requires the Board to consider “release

plans including community resources, employment, education and training, and support

services available to the inmate,” and the Board claimed to have considered Ms.

|“release plans,” Ex. 1 at 12, they did not acknowledge any particulars of Ms.
comprehensive reentry plans. Plans for reentry were particularly
challenging in light of the deportation order, but the Board did not evince meaningful

consideration of this important factor.
Moreover, in light of inevitable deportation to

that Ms.

the Board ’s conclusion

release would be “incompatible with the welfare of society,”

without explanation, demonstrates the Board did not consider the relevant society. Id.

The “society” to which the Board concludes a risk is posed, should Ms.

be

released, is wholly ambiguous. It is certain her release would have no impact on the

welfare ol

residents or on any person residing in the United States. See

Ex. 11, Removal Documents. Yet, the Board’s conclusion demonstrates it did not
consider and weigh the fact that Ms.

will definitely be deported to|

The Board’s failure to specify the relevant community at risk further demonstrates that it

did not consider Ms.

application. If the Board is empowered to consider the

welfare of societies outside the United States, it should clarify that in its decision.

III.

THE BOARD S DECISION IMPERMISSIBLY RELIED EXCLUSIVELY
ON THE SERIOUSNESS OF THE UNDERLYING OFFENSE
The stark imbalance between the Board ’s consideration of Ms.

crime

and its lack of consideration of the voluminous evidence of rehabilitation demonstrates
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that the Board impermissibly relied exclusively on the seriousness of Ms.

offense. The Board had an individualized psychological evaluation detailing Ms.
rehabilitation , a COMPAS assessing Ms.

at the lowest risk of

recidivism, letters of support from the family of the victim , evidence of educational
achievement, letters of support from correctional staff, evidence of completion of
extensive programming, a comprehensive release plan; nevertheless, the Board did not
comment on nor assess any aspect of any of these factors in its decision. The only

assessment the Board engaged in was its conclusion that Ms.

acted “callously”

when, 19 years before, she caused the death ol

--

—

The Board devoted nearly a third of its 200 word decision 63 words to
describing the crime. See id. The remaining 137 words in the decision convey statutory
language and lists of items “noted” or “considered.” See Ex. 1, Parole Hearing Transcript

and Decision, at 12-13 (52 words are devoted to boilerplate language stating Ms.

was denied parole; 41 to listing the statutory factors the Board is required to
consider; 33 to listing the materials the Board received from Ms.|

|; and the final

11 words reiterate the denial of parole.). The discrepancy between the Board ’s emphasis

on Msl

crime and its lack of appraisal of the other required statutory factors

demonstrates the Board’s singular focus on the seriousness of the offense. See Ex. 23,

West v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 41 Misc.3d 1214(A); 2013 NY Slip Op 51688(U)
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2013) (finding that the imbalanced focus on criminal history and subject

crime in hearing transcript coupled with use of statutory language and terse recitation of
statutory categories required new hearing).
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IV.

THE BOARD DID NOT PROVIDE A COMPLETE PAROLE INTERVIEW
PERSONAL
BECAUSE IT REFUSED TO HEAR MS.
STATEMENT AT THE HEARING
The Parole Board impermissibly denied

Msl

the opportunity to make

her personal statement and therefore denied her the complete parole interview to which
she was entitled. See Executive Law 259-i(2)(a)( l ) (requiring that the Board “personally

interview” those eligible for parole hearings). The Board claimed that Ms.
would “...have an opportunity to make any statements that [she’d] like to make during

this [hearing] as well.” Ex. 1 at 3. Yet, when Ms.

requested to read her

personal statement, the Parole Commissioners instructed Ms.

not to read it.

Id. at 7-8. Instead, the Board stated:

I don’t see the letter in the file, but what you can do is have the
counselor fax it over to us and tell us in sum and substance in your
own words without reading it what you’d like us to glean from the
letter.
Id. Since the Board denied parole based on a claim that Ms.

id. at 12, Ms.

callously disregarded

iad

personal

statement would have shed light on her remorse and insight into her crime. See Ex. 8,

Personal Statement of I
“note”

Although the Board claimed, in its decision, to

“personal statement,” Ex. 1 at 13, there is no evidence that the

full personal statement was provided to and considered by the Board before it denied
parole. Moreover, Ms .

was entitled to be “personally interviewed,” ( see

Executive Law 259-i(2)(a)( 1 )). The Board denied her a personal interview when it
stopped her from making a personal statement.
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V.

THE BOARD CLAIMED NOT TO HAVE I'HE SENTENCING MINUTES,
BUT SINCE PORTIONS OF THE MINUTES WERE PROVIDED TO MS.
(EXCEPT A CRITICAL MISSING PAGE) THEY WERE
AVAILABLE TO THE BOARD

The Board did not consider the sentencing minutes although they were part of the
parole file. The Board stated it did not have the sentencing minutes. Ex. 1 at 3, but this is

inaccurate because DOCCS provided Ms.

|with the sentencing minutes from

her parole file (minus a missing page 8) before the hearing took place. Ex . 21, Aff. of

Martha Rayner.

In preparation for her parole hearing, Ms.

requested her entire parole

file pursuant to 9 N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. §8000.5. See Ex. 24, Request for

|Parole File March 11 , 2015.

On April 20, 2015, Ms.

counsel

received a mailing from DOCCS in response to the request. See Ex. 2, Petitioner’s
Administrative Appeal, May 19, 2015, at 2; Ex. 21. DOCCS’s response included a copy
of the sentencing minutes (except page 8). Id. In those sentencing minutes, Ms.

discusses her crime and her remorse. See Ex . 25, Sentencing Minutes, October
24, 1997. Although the copy provided by DOCCS is abruptly cut off in the middle of Ms.

statement to the sentencing court (page 8 is missing), there is no question
the Board had access to at least the portion provided to Ms.

and most likely

the full transcript, yet by the Board’s own admission it did not consider the minutes.
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VI .

THE BOARD RELIED ON INFORMATION IN MS.
PAROLE FILE THAT SHE REQUESTED BUT WAS NOT PROVIDED
BEFORE THE PAROLE HEARING
At the hearing, the Board referred to and relied upon an “OMH report” 16 in Ms.

parole file. See Ex. 1 at 4. Despite Ms.

making a timely request

for her entire parole file, including medical summaries and reports, see Ex. 24, DOCCS’

response to her request did not include an OMH report. Ex . 21 , Affirmation of Martha
Rayner. With the exception of materials outlined in to 9 N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs.

§§8000.5 (c)(2)(a) and (b), Ms|

would consider. Ms.

was entitled to receive all materials the Board

OMH report and other medical information do not fall

within any of the disclosure exceptions. It is difficult to conceive how release of such

information to Ms.

would cause harm to Ms.

another person,
supervision. Id.

breach information received in confidence, or disrupt Ms|

Therefore, the Board failed to provide Ms.
which Ms.
VII .

with materials it relied on and to

Iwas entitled.

THE BOARD UNLAWFULLY WITHHELD PORTIONS OF MS.
PAROLE FILE
The Board unlawfully withheld documents that Ms.

Iwas entitled to

receive as part of her preparation for her hearing pursuant to N .Y . COMP CODES R . &
REGS. TIT. 9, § 8000.5. First, portions of Ms

COMPAS assessment were

inappropriately redacted . See Ex. 12, 2015 COMPAS Assessment. Second, Ms.
did not receive page two of the ISR /Parole Report /Crime/Sentence

Information. See Ex. 21. Third, Msj

16 OMH

did not receive any medical records or

is likely the Office of Mental Health .
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summaries, including the “OMH Report.” Id. Fourth , the Board did provide Ms.
with the October 24, 1997, sentencing minutes, but page eight was missing.

See Ex. 21; see Ex. 25, Sentencing Minutes. Finally, Ms|

never received the

New York State Department of Correctional Service’s recommendation regarding her

deportation. See NY Correct Law § 147.

VIII. TIIE COMPAS ASSESSMENT CONTAINED ERRONEOUS
CRIMOGENIC
INFORMATION REGARDING MS.
NEEDS
Ms.

COMPAS assessment is rife with errors and the Board therefore

relied on incorrect information in rendering its decision. The COMPAS assessment, dated
April 1 , 2015, states Ms.

“Prison Release Status” as “Max out.” See Ex. 13,

2015 COMPAS Assessment . This designation is incorrect. The April 27, 2015 hearing

was Ms.

third parole hearing: the first occurred on April 20, 2011; the

second occurred on April 8, 2013, and the third was the instant 2015 hearing on appeal
here. See Ex. 5, Letter to Parole Board and Exhibit List Submitted on Behalf of

|(April 23, 2015). Since Ms|

is serving a sentence of 15 years to

life, the designation of “max out” does not apply.
The COMPAS assessment also contained inaccurate information. The “History

of Violence” assessment, which scored Ms.

|as “medium”, was placed under

the “Crimogenic Needs Scales”, but “History of Violence” is not a “need.” During the
hearing, the Board noted the score of “medium ” on “History of Violence.” See Ex. 1 at 3.

By placing the category within the crimogenic needs section, the COMPAS suggests that

can change this score when in fact it is based on a wholly static factor-

Ms.

—

her crime that cannot be changed.
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CONCLUSION

For these reasons, Ms.

respectfully requests that this Court grant the

petition and reverse the denial of parole, order Respondents to hold a de novo parole

hearing according to law and based on a contemporary record, and to grant any other

relief as this Court may deem appropriate.

Dated: New York, New York
December 11, 2015
Martm Rayner, Esq.
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